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This special issue collects a selection of the papers presented at the 
International Colloquium Word and Object, 50 Years Later, which took 
place in Rome on May 28-29, 2010. In the fiftieth year since the 
publication of Word and Object, the conference aimed at celebrating 
one of the most famous and influential philosophers and mathemati-
cians of the 20th Century: Willard Van Orman Quine. The purpose of 
the conference, organised by the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ 
and the Research Group APhEx (Analytical and Philosophical Expla-
nation), was to discuss and explore some of the major Quinean the-
ses. This volume collects the contributions of Marianna Antonutti 
Marfori, Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni, Alberto Voltolini, Stephen 
White, and Giancarlo Zanet, who were speakers at the conference. 
The papers are unified by a common thread that is represented by the 
Quinean philosophical heritage and take their stance within the differ-
ent areas of the current philosophical debate on this issue. 
Quinean theses marked several fields of philosophy and, since its 
publication, Word and Object has become a landmark in the canon of 
analytical philosophy. During the two-day conference, at least three 
subjects came to the foreground, especially for their potential to still 
unveil, after half a century, some common prejudices in the philoso-
phy of language. First, the thesis of indeterminacy of translation, 
which questioned the definition of the object of translation itself, the 
notion of a translation manual and the concept of translation equiva-
lence. Second, Quine’s holistic view of language, which highlighted 
the problem of determining the locus (if any) and the function of the 
units constitutive of meaning. As is well known, Quine came to 
doubt the very notion of meaning on account of his holistic view. 
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Holism, the view that the sentences of a language have to face the 
“tribunal of experience” together, has still a deep influence on the 
philosophical understanding of the way language is connected to 
reality. Third, his thesis of the inscrutability of reference puzzled 
analytical philosophers on the nature of their ontological commit-
ments, the criteria of identity of extension, the role of conceptual 
schemes, etc. and put into question the validity of the very notion of 
reference.  
However, the Quinean contribution is not limited to the philoso-
phy of language. His work sheds light on many important topics in the 
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. He is cele-
brated for introducing a naturalised conception of epistemology, 
which emphasised the role of the natural scientific method in deter-
mining the processes of knowledge acquisition. On the one hand, this 
view brought him to embrace behaviourism, the thesis that psycho-
logical terms do not refer to inner mental states and instead are to be 
analysed in terms of speakers’ dispositions to verbal behaviour. On 
the other hand, he rejected the traditional philosophical study of 
scientific knowledge and mathematics in particular, because of its 
failure to reduce mathematics to pure logic.  
The papers presented in this volume show that Quine’s philosophy 
is not yet a matter for history, but on the contrary has marked a path 
of inquiry still resourceful nowadays: his indispensability argument in 
mathematics, his critique of modal logic, his conception of naturalism 
and the ways it is applied in contemporary philosophy of mind, and 
his remarks on the notion of translation. Marianna Antonutti Mar-
fori’s paper (‘Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the 
Quine-Maddy Debate’) focuses on the possibility of naturalising 
mathematical practice and offers a positive attempt to elucidate 
Penelope Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in a Quinean 
perspective. As it is known, according to Quine, mathematics is part 
of our best overall theory of the world because it is indispensable to 
scientific theories. Confirmational holism guarantees that indispensa-
ble mathematics is empirically confirmed in virtue of its successful 
application in scientific practice. This view entails the so-called Indis-
pensability Argument (which seeks to establish the conclusion that we 
ought to believe in the existence of entities, i.e. mathematical enti-
ties, that are indispensable to scientific theories). According to this 
Quinean line of argument, it follows that unapplied mathematics has 
to be rejected as frivolous and we should adopt a strong revisionary 
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approach to mathematical practice. Maddy argues against such a 
position. An important motivation behind her view is to account for 
the methodological autonomy of mathematics. In her paper, Anto-
nutti Marforiillustrates Maddy’s position in detail in order to assess 
whether it can accommodate an anti-revisionary stance on mathemat-
ics within Quinean naturalism. More specifically, Antonutti explains 
Maddy’s grounds for rejecting the conclusion of the Indispensability 
Argument while maintaining that mathematics is indispensable to 
science. She then shows how Maddy can avoid the objection that her 
view entails that mathematics and pseudo-science are on a par, and 
reformulates the objection so that it cannot be avoided. Finally, 
Antonutti argues that Maddy’s view faces a dilemma, and ultimately 
fails to account for the methodological autonomy of mathematics 
within Quinean naturalism.  
The paper by Jacob Busch and Andrea Sereni, (‘Indispensability 
Arguments and their Quinean Heritage’), also focuses on philosophy 
of mathematics. It concerns the Indispensability Arguments for 
mathematical Platonism in connection with Quine’s thesis. Quine’s 
Indispensability Argument for mathematics is considered by many to 
be the strongest argument for mathematical realism: mathematical 
entities (i.e. sets, numbers, functions, etc.) are indispensable to our 
best scientific theories, therefore we ought to be ontologically com-
mitted to their existence. Bush and Sereni present some of the most 
discussed versions of the Indispensability Argument and show both 
theoretical and exegetical problems with Quine’s view. They propose 
a different approach to indispensability that emphasizes the theoretical 
contributions of mathematics and Quine’s remarks on unobservable 
entities. They suggest two minimal versions of indispensability, which 
they label the ‘logical’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ points of view. 
From the logical point of view, the notion of indispensability is under-
stood in terms of the expressive power of theories: mathematics is 
indispensable to science because of nominalised theories. From the 
theory-contribution point of view, mathematical entities contribute 
to scientific theories in relevantly similar ways as theoretical entities 
do. The minimal version of indispensability they propose is an in-
stance of the Inference to the Best Explanation. 
Alberto Voltolini’s paper (‘All the existences that there are’) con-
cerns the question whether existence has to be taken either as a first-
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order or as a second-order property. He proposes a three-fold notion 
of existence: as a second-order property, typically expressed by the 
particular quantifier; as a substantive first-order property of individuals, 
i.e. having a certain weight, being human, being Italian; and as a 
blanket property of individuals, i.e. the property of being (identical 
with) something. Voltolini explains what these properties are and 
why we need them all for our ontological purposes. Relying on this 
assumption, he vindicates a Meinongian position that endorses both 
first-order properties by giving arguments in favour of this view as the 
correct position in ontology; he further explores the limits of linguis-
tic approaches to the ontology of existence, by means of a descriptive 
analysis of the behaviour of “there is” and “exists”. 
In ‘The indeterminacy of translation: Fifty years later’, Stephen 
White offers a critical perspective on Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy 
of translation. White presents Quine’s well-known ‘Gavagai’ mental 
experiment and shows the difficulties that arise when we want to 
equate referring expressions or predicates in the language being 
translated and our own. In his thought experiment of radical transla-
tion, Quine proposes a situation in which both the linguist and the 
native speaker see a rabbit. Quine imagines that the native speaker 
pronounces ‘Gavagai’ in seeing the rabbit, and that the linguist no-
tices this behaviour whenever the rabbit is present. In observing a 
strong correlation between the presence of a rabbit and the expres-
sion ‘Gavagai’ pronounced by the native speaker, the linguist will 
infer that ‘Gavagai’ means ‘rabbit’: ‘Gavagai’ is a one-word sentence 
with the same stimulus meaning as our sentence ‘There is a rabbit’. In 
fact, the meaning of a sentence as a stimulus to verbal behaviour is 
defined by what type of response it arouses in the native. Namely, 
stimulus meaning is a good approximation to meaning, as it is intui-
tively understood. However – Quine argues – if the linguist assigns 
the term ‘Gavagai’ to rabbits, it does not mean that the native could 
not use that term to refer to a ’rabbit-stage’ or a ‘rabbit-phase’. If this 
were so, ‘Gavagai’ could refer, for example, to an ‘undetached rabbit 
part’. According to the Quinean thesis of inscrutability of reference, 
equally correct translation manuals might translate the same words 
using completely different references. Therefore, as White points 
out, the difficulty arises because we can associate ‘Gavagai’, con-
strued as a term, with two very different terms in English and pre-
serve the stimulus meaning of ‘Gavagai’ construed as a one-word 
sentence. Thus, White explores whether non-trivial examples of 
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object” 321 
indeterminacy are achievable by considering some objections to the 
appeal to verbal dispositions in characterising meaning and offers an 
alternative framework.  
In ‘Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading’, Gian-
carlo Zanet explores the main features of Quine’s account of mind-
reading within the current debate between theory-theorists, rational-
ity-theorists, and hybrid-theorists. The concern is with the broad 
issue of how to characterize the way we understand people and how 
we attribute to them propositional attitudes (i.e. beliefs, desires, and 
intentions). Moreover, he points out that the role that folk psychol-
ogy plays in Quine’s philosophy is crucial. Such a role enlightens the 
difference between Quine and Davidson on rationality. According to 
Zanet, a theory of rationality can be captured in a Quinean perspec-
tive if we take him as a proponent of a kind of hybrid theory, a blend 
of theory-theory and simulation. In conclusion, he proposes a blend 
of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mind-
reading in a Quinean context. 
We would like to conclude this brief introduction by thanking the 
authors of the papers collected in this volume for their willingness to 
cooperate during the whole review process. We also thank all 
the participants at the conference “Word and Object, 50 years later”, 
the Organising Committee (Marianna Antonutti Marfori, Daniele 
Santoro, Stefano Vaselli, Pierluigi Graziani, Carlo Tatasciore, Stefano 
Poggi and the Italian Society for Philosophy) and the Scientific Com-
mittee (Massimiliano Carrara, Carlo Cellucci, Roberto Cord-
eschi, Mario De Caro, Leon Horsten, Teresa Marques, Marco San-
tambrogio, Celia Teixeira). We are grateful to the Editorial Commit-
tee of Disputatio, the editors Teresa Marques and João Branquinho, 
for all the support given to the publication of this volume. Last but 
not least, we profoundly appreciate the efforts of the referees in 
reviewing the papers. Without their help, this special issue would not 
exist. 
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